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Domestic Relations
Domestic Relations; adoptions
Business and Professions Code § 4996.21 (new); Civil Code
§§ 220.15, 221.05, 221.07, 224.21, 224.24, 224.26, 224.44,
224.62,224.63, 224.64 (new); §§ 220.20,222.10, 224.30,
224.36 (amended).
AB 3456 (Conroy); 1992 STAT. Ch. 667

SB 1148 (Bergeson); 1991 STAT. Ch. 1353
Existing law provides for agency adoptions, in which a mother
relinquishes legal custody of her child to an adoption agency.
Existing law also provides for independent adoptions which allow a
mother to select potential adoptive parents.2 Chapter 667 provides
that parents can relinquish 3 their child4 to a licensed adoption
6
agency 5 or to the Department of Social Services (Department)
while still designating who the adoptive parents should be. 7 Chapter
1.
CAL. Civ. CODE § 222.10 (West Supp. 1992). Parental rights terminate when the
relinquishment is filed with the Department of Social Services unless both the parents and the
adoption agency mutually agree. Id.
2.
Id. § 224.20 (West Supp. 1992); see Anthony Carsola, Adoption Debate, L.A. TIMs, Dec.
10, 1987, § 5, at All (describing the advantages of both independent and agency adoptions); Diane
Cole, PersonalFinance; The Cost of Pursuinga Private Adoption, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16, 1987, at
§ 3, II (explaining the cost benefit differences between independent and agency adoptions); Marjorie
Maguire Shultz, Reproductive Technology andIntent-BasedParenthood:An Opportunityfor Gender
Neutrality, Wis. L. REv. 297, 382, n.277 (1990) (specifying that most complaints against agency
adoptions concern the long wait and the many state requirements); cf DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 904
(1991) (specifying that adoptions must be made through an authorized agency or the Department of
Services for Children unless the child is sought to be adopted by a stepparent or blood relative).
3.
See CAL. CIv. CODE § 222.10(a) (amended by Chapter 667) (describing relinquishment
of a child to an adoption agency as a written statement which is signed before two subscribing
witnesses and acknowledged by an authorized official from the Department of Social Services or
adoption agency).
4.
See id. § 220.20(0 (amended by Chapter 1353) (defining child for this section as a minor
child).
5.
See id. § 220.20() (amended by Chapter 1353) (defining licensed adoption agency).
6.
See WELF. & INST. CODE § 10550 (West 1991) (establishing the State Department of
Social Services).
7.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 222.10(e) (amended by Chapter 667); see Baby Boy M. v. Stephanie
M., 221 Cal. App. 3d 475,480-81,272 Cal. Rptr. 27,30 (1990) (comparing independent and agency
adoptions and the relinquishment problems of each); Anthony T. Carsola, Adoption Debate, L.A.
TIwES, Dec. 10, 1987 § 5A, at 11 (discussing how the ability to identify the adoptive parents is one
of the main problems with agency adoptions and a main advantage of independent adoptions);
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667 further provides that after receiving notification of the child's
placement,8 the parent has thirty days from the time the notice was
mailed in which to rescind the relinquishment.9 If the parents do not
rescind the relinquishment within thirty days, the Department or
agency will choose the adoptive parents.l" If the birth parents and
Department or adoption agency wish to pick different adoptive
parents within the thirty day period, they must rescind the old
relinquishment and make a new one."
For independent adoptions, Chapter 1353 specifies when a child
is considered placed for adoption,12 specifies duties of an adoption
service provider, 13 and requires that the adoptive parent, birth parent
and adoption service provider sign a placement agreement. 14
Chapter 1353 also provides that birth parents must be advised of their
rights and offered three counseling sessions. 5 Chapter 1353 further
pro-vides that the consent for adoption becomes final after 121 days

Elizabeth Miehren, The Adoption Debate; Child's Beating Death Reheats Traditional-Independent
Battle, L.A. TWMES, Nov. 25, 1987, § 5, at 1 (discussing identified adoption in comparison to the
problems and benefits of agency and independent adoptions, and describing the serious problems of
baby selling in independent adoptions compared with the safer comprehensive screening process used
by adoption agencies).
8.
See CAL. ClV. CODE § 222.10(f) (amended by Chapter 667) (specifying that the
Department or agency must notify the birth parents within 72 hours if they decide not to place the
child in the home designated by the birth parents or decide to remove the child from the home); id.
(specifying that such a notice is required only if the child is not placed in the home of the designated
parents or if the child is removed from the home prior to the adoption being granted).
9.
Id. § 222.10(g)(1)-(3) (amended by Chapter 667).
10.
Id § 222.10(g)(2) (amended by Chapter 667).
11.
Id. § 222.10(g)(3) (amended by Chapter 667).
12.
Id. § 224.21(a)-(d) (amended by Chapter 1353).
13.
Id, § 224.26(a)-(c) (amended by Chapter 1353).
14.
Id § 224.21(b)(I)-(6) (amended by Chapter 1353).
15.
Id. § 224.24(a)-(d) (amended by Chapter 1353); see id. § 224.24(e) (amended by Chapter
1353) (providing that the individual who counsels the birth parents owes a duty of care similar to a
psychotherapist-patient relationship); Baby Boy M. v. Stephanie M., 221 Cal. App. 3d 475, 475-78,
272 Cal. Rptr. 27,27-28 (1990) (demonstrating what rights a birth parent is notified of, and holding
that a birth parent was entitled to reclaim her baby up to six months after delivering it to adoptive
parents); Jane A. Robert, ParentalConsent: The Need For An Informed Decision in the Private
Adoption Scheme, 47 LA. L. REV. 889, 889-90 (1987) (discussing various problems with independent
adoptions including the inability of a birth parent to understand the ramifications of her actions, the
lack of certainty, the harm to a child being taken away from adoptive parents, and the inexperience
of those acting as intermediaries in the process, and proposing that a new adoption scheme could
include such advantages found in agency adoption in order to cure the above mentioned problems);
id at 889, n.4 (stating that Minnesota, Connecticut, Delaware, Michigan and Massachusetts have
outlawed private adoptions).
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if no further action is taken. 16 Chapter 1353 additionally deletes a
court's authority to retain jurisdiction over a child after an adoption
petition is withdrawn, and to order a child restored to birth parents in
specified circumstances. 17
EB
Domestic Relations; child custody--jurisdiction
Civil Code §§ 5152, 5157, 5158 (amended).

SB 804 (Boatwright); 1992 STAT. Ch. 392
The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA) was
adopted to avoid jurisdiction competition and conflicting child
custody decrees 2 from courts of other states.3 Under UCCJA, a state

16.
CAL. CIrv. CODE § 224.63(a)(3) (enacted by Chapter 1353); cf id. § 232(a)(1) (West Supp.
1992) (requiring a six month period before the birth parent legally abandons the child); see Sonni
Efron, ParentsSeek Reforms In Adoption Law; Custody: A San Juan Capistrano Couple Lost Their
Adoptive Child Lead the Chargeto End the Legal Limbo for Such Children,L.A. TIMEs, Mar. 17,
1991, at B1 (discussing the fight to change confusing, inhumane and insensitive California adoption
laws, and make independent adoptions as rapid, certain and predictable as possible); id (describing
the background of the Baby Boy M. case, and specifying that only four percent of birth mothers
change their minds and want their babies back); Jerry Gillam, Bill to Establish Finality Rule For
Adoptions OK'D by Senate,L.A. TIMES, June 1, 1991, at A25 (discussing Senator Bergeson's views
that the longer a child remains in an adoptive home without final consent, the longer the child is
harmed). See generally Frisk v. Director, Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 107 Cal. App. 2d 31, 32-33, 236
P.2d 427, 428-29 (1951) (discussing the problems of relinquishment in independent adoptions).
17.
CAL. CIv. CODE § 224.36 (amended by Chapter 1353); see Nancy Weaver, Legislature
May Change Law on Independent Adoptions, SACRANMENTO BEE, Aug. 5, 1992, at B1 (discussing
how the Academy of California Adoption Lawyers opposes SB 1148 because it would make
adoptions too cumbersome, and thus diminish the number of adoptions).

I.
CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 5150-5174 (West 1983 and Supp. 1992) (enacting UCCJA).
2.
See id. § 5151(4) (West 1983) (defining custody decree).
3.
Id. § 5150(1)(a) (West 1983); see id. § 5150(1)(b)-(i) (West 1983) (stating additional
purposes of UCCJA legislation). See generally Christopher L. Blakely, Child Custody-Jurisdiction
and Procedure,35 EMORY L.i. 291 (1986) (discussing UCCJA and other child custody legislation);
Doris Jonas Freed & Timothy B. Walker, Family Law In The Fifty States: An Overview, 24 FAM.
L.Q. 309 (1991) (discussing the current state of family law in the United States); E.L. Thompson,
ProtectingAbused Children:A Judge'sPerspective on Public Law Deprived Child Proceedingsand
the Impact of the Indian Child Welfare Acts, YouTH LAw NEws, Mar.-Apr. 1991, at 1-115
(reviewing the courts' interpretation of child protection legislation); Review of Selected 1978
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court competent to decide child custody matters has jurisdiction to
initiate or modify child custody determinations 4 if it is necessary to
protect the child because he or she has been subjected to or
threatened with mistreatment or abuse, or the child is otherwise
neglected or dependent. Chapter 392 gives the court child custody
jurisdiction if the parent of the child is subjected to or threatened with
mistreatment or abuse, or otherwise is the victim of domestic
violence.'

California Legislation, 11 PAC. LJ. 465 (1979) (reviewing legislation incorporating portions of
UCCJA).
4.
See CAL CIV. CODE § 5151(2) (West 1983) (defining custody determination); id. §
5151(6) (West 1983) (defining initial decree); id. § 5151(7) (West 1983) (defining modification
decree).
5.
IdL § 5152(a)(3)(B) (amended by Chapter 392); see People v. Beach, 194 Cal. App. 3d
955, 970, 240 Cal. Rptr. 50, 57-58 (1987) (holding that a father's allegation that his wife would
remove the minor child from the court's jurisdiction was an emergency-type situation sufficient to
confer jurisdiction for the court to issue an interim custody order); In re Marriage of Kern, 87 Cal.
App. 3d 402, 408, 150 Cal. Rptr. 860, 863-64 (1978) (holding that because the mother failed to show
that the child's health or safety would be in jeopardy, and where the record did not indicate
otherwise, a California court could not exercise jurisdiction and must allow the nonresident's forum
state court to adjudicate custody issue); cf. ALA. CODE § 30-3-23 (1989); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §
8-403 (1989); ARK. CODE. ANN. § 9-27-306 (Michie 1991); COLO. REv. STAT. § 14-13-104 (1987);
CONN. GEM. STAT. ANN. § 46b-93 (West 1986); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-4503 (1989); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 19-9-43 (Michie 1991); HAW. REV. STAT. § 583-3 (1985); ILL ANN. STAT. ch. 40, para. 2104
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1992); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-1-11.6-3 (Burns 1979); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-1303
(1986); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:1702 (West 1983); MASS. GEM. LAws ANN. ch. 209B, § 2 (West
1987); MIcH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 600.653 (West 1981); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518A.03 (West 1990);
Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-23-5 (Supp. 1991); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 452.450 (Vernon 1986); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 40-4-211 (1991); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50A-3 (1989); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 125A.050
(Michie 1991); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 458-A:3 (1992); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAWv § 75-d (McKinney
1988); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-14-03 (1991); OR. REV. STAT. § 109.730 (1990); 23 PA. CONS. STAT.
§ 5344 (1991); R.I. GEM. LAws § 15-14-4 (1988); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.53 (West 1986);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-45c-3 (1992); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.27.030 (West 1986); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 822.03 (West 1986); WYO. STAT. § 20-5-104 (1987) (granting jurisdiction to the state court
to initiate or modify child custody decrees).
6.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 5152(a)(3)(B) (amended by Chapter 392); see CAL. CV. PROC. CODE
§ 542 (West Supp. 1992) (defining domestic violence); see also Caldwell v. Coppola, 219 Cal. App.
3d 859, 863, 268 Cal. Rptr. 453, 455 (1990) (holding "household member" as used in California
Civil Procedure Code § 542 protects both married and unmarried cohabitants); cf CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 277(a) (West Supp. 1992) (defining domestic violence for the purpose of criminal child abduction);
CAL WEL. & INST. CODE § 18291(a) (West 1991) (defining domestic violence for the purposes of
the Domestic Violence Centers Act). See generally Linda R. Keenan, Note, Domestic Violence and
Custody Litigation:The Needfor Statutory Reform, 13 HoFsTRA L. REV. 407, 416 (19S5) (criticizing
specific provisions of UCCIA for not addressing the needs of battered women).
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Under existing law, the court may decline to exercise jurisdiction7
when the petitioner for custody has undertaken certain actions.
Chapter 392 states that the court cannot consider, as a factor
weighing against the petitioner, any taking or retention of the child
after a visit or other temporary relinquishment of physical custody,
from the person who has legal custody, if there is evidence that the
taking or retention of the child was a result of domestic violence
against the petitioner.'
Existing law also requires every party in a custody proceeding to
give specified information under oath.9 Chapter 392 provides that

7.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 5157 (amended by Chapter 392). The court may decline jurisdiction
where a party has wrongfully taken the child from another state, improperly removed the child from
the physical custody of the person entitled to custody, improperly retained the child after a visit, or
violated any other custody decree provision of another state. Id. § 5157(1)-(5) (amended by Chapter
392); see CAL. PENAL CODE § 277 (West Supp. 1992) (prohibiting child abduction, notwithstanding
right to custody, unless under good cause); Rogers v. Platt, 199 Cal. App. 3d 1204, 1215, 245 Cal.
Rptr. 532, 539 (1988) (holding that a nonresident couple's unlawful behavior in refusing to return
the child to the natural mother's custody upon her request precluded the District of Columbia, where
the couple resided, from assuming jurisdiction over the child custody dispute); see also In re
Marriage of Fox, 180 Cal. App. 3d 862, 870, 225 Cal. Rptr. 823, 827 (1986) (ruling that the trial
court had improperly declined jurisdiction over a child custody dispute although the mother had taken
the child to California without a valid and legal reason); cf. ALA. CODE § 30-3-28 (1989); ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 8-408 (1989); ARK. CODE. ANN. § 9-13-208 (Michie 1991); COLO.REv. STAT. § 1413-109 (1987); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-98 (West 1986); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-4508 (1989);
GA. CODE ANN. § 19-9-48 (Michie 1991); HAw.REV. STAT. § 583-8 (1985); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
40, para. 2109 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1992); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-1-11.6-8 (Burns 1979); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 38-1308 (1986); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:1707 (West 1983); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
209B, § 7 (West 1987); MICH. COm'. LAwS ANN. § 600.658 (West 1981); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
518A.08 (West 1990); MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-23-15 (Supp. 1991); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 452.475
(Vernon 1986); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-109 (1991); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50A-8 (1989); NEV.REV.
STAT. ANN. § 125A.080 (Michie 1991); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 458-A:8 (1992); N.Y. DOm. REL.
LAw § 75-i (McKinney 1988); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-14-08 (1991); OR. REV. STAT. § 109.780
(1990); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5349 (1991); R.I. GEN. LAws § 15-14-9 (1988); TEX. FAM. CODE
ANN. § 11.58 (West 1986); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-45c-8 (1992); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
26.27.080 (West 1986); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 822.03 (West 1986); Wyo. STAT. § 20-5-108 (1987)
(stating circumstances where the court may decline jurisdiction).
8.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 5157(0 (amended by Chapter 392); see In re Cline, 433 N.E.2d 51,
(1982) (holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to exercise its jurisdiction
where separate California proceedings had been filed by the wife, California was a convenient forum
to determine the dispute, and the wife alleged that she was a battered spouse).
9.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 5158(a) (amended by Chapter 392). Information required under oath
includes the child's present address and places where the child has lived for the past five years, and
the names and present addresses of the persons with whom the child lived during that period. Id.; see
In re David C. 152 Cal. App. 3d 1189, 1204, 200 Cal. Rptr. 115, 124 (1984) (holding that the
Department of Human Resource's failure to file a declaration containing required information was
not prejudicial where other documents submitted contained the same information); cf. ALA. CODE §
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where there are allegations of domestic violence or child abuse, the
addresses of the child and party shall be confidential and shall not be
disclosed to the other party when the addresses are unknown to the
other party.' 0

JWC
Domestic Relations; child support collection--employee
information reports
Unemployment Insurance Code § 1088.5 (new); Welfare and
Institutions Code § 11478.51 (new).
SB 1423 (Morgan); 1992 STAT. Ch. 850
Existing law authorizes the Employment Development Department (Department)' to use earning and employment information

30-3-29 (1989); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-409 (1989); ARK. CODE. ANN. § 9-13-209 (Michie
1991); CoLo. REV. STAT. § 14-13-110 (1987); CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 461-99 (,Vest 1986); D.C.
CODE ANN. § 16-4509 (1989); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-9-49 (Michie 1991); HAw. REV. STAT. § 583-9
(1985); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, para. 2110 (Smith-Hurd 1980); Ibn. CODE ANN. § 31-1-11.6-9
(Bums Supp. 1992); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-1309 (1986); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 13:1708 (West
1983); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 209B, § 3 (West 1987); MIcH. COmp. LAws ANN. § 600.659
(West 1981); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518A.09 (West 1990); MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-23-17 (Supp.
1991); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 452.480 (Vernon 1986); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-110 (1991); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 50A-9 (1989); NEv. REV. STAT. ANN. § 125A.120 (Michie 1991); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 458-A:9 (1992); N.Y. DOM. REL LAw § 75-j (McKinney 1988); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-14-09
(1991); OR. REV. STAT. § 109.790 (1990); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5350 (1991); R.I. GEN. LAws §
15-14-10 (1988); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.59 (West 1986); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-45c-9 (1992);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.27.090 (West 1986); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 822.09 (West 1986); Wyo.
STAT. § 20-5-110 (1987) (requiring certain information to be submitted to the court in child custody
determinations).
10.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 5158(a) (amended by Chapter 392); see 65 Cal. Op. Att'y. Gen 186,
188 (1981) (stating that information contained in the state Department of Justice child abuse files
must be provided to child protective agencies or to district attorneys seeking such information, but
no obligation exists to any other person or agency); cf. Brennan v. Brennan, 422 A.2d 510, 515-17
(Pa. 1980) (holding that defendant's attorney was justified in invoking attorney-client privilege when
refusing to disclose to the court and plaintiff mother the address of the defendant and the children
who were subjects of custody proceedings). The court recognized the long standing principle that the
attorney-client privilege exists in order to foster confidence between an advocate and client, thereby
leading to a trusting and open dialogue. Id.

1.
See CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE § 301 (West 1986) (establishing the Employment
Development Department within the Health and Welfare Agency). The Department is vested with the
duties, purposes, responsibilities, and jurisdiction previously exercised by the State Department of
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provided by employers to assist in the collection of child support.'
Under existing law, employers are required to report wages paid and
other employee information to the department.' Chapter 850 requires
additional employer reporting on new employees within thirty days
of the hiring, rehiring, or return to work of any person on whom the
employer was required to report.4 Under Chapter 850, the EmployBenefit Payments or the Health and Welfare Agency with respect to job creation activities. Id.
2.
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 11478.5(b) (West Supp. 1992). The California Parent Locator
Service and Central Registry requests and receives earning and employment information about any
parent who has deserted or abandoned a child, spouse or former spouse, from the Employment
Development Department in response to absent parent inquiries, and transmits the information to local
district attorneys to assist with wage assignment enforcement. Il § 11478.5(a)-(b) (West Supp. 1992);
see State ex. reL Jones v. Meyers, 581 N.E.2d 629, 630 (Ohio 1990) (stating that public policy
requires the court to liberally construe statutory provisions defining public records, and to strictly
construe the exceptions set forth to disclosure of such records). See generally Kilroy v. National
Labor Relations Bd., 633 F. Supp. 136, 143 (S.D. Ohio 1985) (interpreting invasion of privacy as
occurring when disclosure would subject a person to embarrassment, harassment, physical danger,
disgrace, or loss of employment or friends); Miller v. Miller, 71 Cal. App. 3d 145, 148, 139 Cal.
Rptr. 521, 523 (1977) (describing the legislative intent to promote disclosure of information in
circumstances where a father fails to support his children, exemplified by the statutory exception to
Revenue and Taxation Code § 19282, which provides for disclosure of income tax information to
facilitate child support collection); Laurel Pallock, Geting Child Support Help, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 23,
1991, at C3 (describing available methods of enforcing child support orders).
3.
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 11478.8(a)-(b) (West Supp. 1992). An employer or labor
organization shall cooperate with and provide within 20 days relevant employment and income
information to the district attorney for the purpose of establishing, modifying or enforcing the support
obligation when a request from the district attorney for such information is received. Id § 11478.8(b)
(West Supp. 1992). The information includes: (1) the parent's full name, along with any known
aliases; (2) the date and place of birth; (3) a physical description; (4) the social security number, (5)
employment and earnings history; (6) military status and service serial number, (7) last known
address and telephone number, (8) driver's license number, (9) criminal, licensing, and applicant
records and information; and (10) any income or income tax information. Id. § 11478.5(a) (West
Supp. 1992); cf ALASKA STAT. § 25.25.150(a) (1991) (designating the child support enforcement
agency as the state information and locator agency whose duty is to locate obligors by utilizing all
sources of information available in the state, and in other states, including information concerning
the last known address of the obligor, and the name and address of the last known employer, even
if such information is made confidential by state statute, but may only use such information for
purposes of child support enforcement); ARiZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 25-330 (1991) (providing for the
disclosure of residential and business address and periodic earning information by employers to
requesting parties who show the employer proof of entitlement to support or maintenance, or by an
agency that has obtained a judgment in its favor in a paternity action or action to establish child
support, and holding the employer responsible for any legal fees that may be incurred by the
requesting party to obtain the information requested from the employer).
4.
CAL. UNEMP. INs. CODE § 1088.5(e)(1) (enacted by Chapter 850). Each employer must
report the following information to the department: (1) The hiring of any person who resides or
works in this state to whom the employer anticipates paying earnings; (2) the rehiring or return to
work of any person who has been laid off, furloughed, separated, granted a leave without pay, or
terminated from employment; and (3) to whom the employer anticipates paying wages. a §
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ment Development Department (EDD),f when requested,' must
match information provided by employers against the Department of
Social Services' list of persons owing child support.7 When the
employer information concerns any person the Department of Social
Services has information about, the EDD must transmit the infor-

1088.5(b)(1)(2) (enacted by Chapter 850). Employers do not have to report on any person paid wages
less than $300 each month, or any person under eighteen years of age. Id. § 1088.5(c)(1)(2). The
employer report shall contain the first initial, last name, and social security number of the employee
and the employer's name, address, and state employer identification number. Id § 1088.5(e)(2)(A)(B)
(enacted by Chapter 850). The Employment Development Department must retain information
collected for 90 days after the end of the calendar quarter. Id § 1088.5(g) (enacted by Chapter 850).
Chapter 850 improves existing child support enforcement methods which rely upon the service of
wage assignments on employers. CALIFORNIA SENATE FLOOR ANALYsIS oF SB 1423, at 3 (May 22,
1992). To be effective, a stable work force is needed since the assignment becomes ineffective when
an obligor leaves an employer. Id The existing employee data sources that district attorneys rely
upon are at least five months old, allowing employees who frequently change jobs to remain
undetected. 11
5.
See CAL. UNmip. INS. CODE § 301 (West 1986) (establishing the Employment
Development Department within the Heath and Welfare Agency).
6.
See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 11478.51(a) (enacted by Chapter 850) (providing that
the Employment Development Department must, when requested by the Department of Social
Services or the Parent Locator Service, compare information collected under § 1088.5 of the
Unemployment Insurance Code to information provided by the Department of Social Services).
7.
Id; see CAL. UNEMiP. INS. CODE § 1088.5(a)-(c) (enacted by Chapter 850) (stating the
information employers are required to report). The crossmatching process identifies claimants who
fraudulently receive unemployment benefits during a quarter when they also receive wages, providing
substantial returns to the Unemployment Insurance fund. Letter from Thomas P. Nagle, Director,
Employment Development Department, to California employers, (May 1992); cf WASH. REV. CODE
§ 26.23.040 (1991) (requiring employers to report all new hires and rehires within 35 days of hire
to improve the child support enforcement system and reduce the amount of unpaid child support).
See generally, OFFICE OF SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT, WASHINGTON STATE SUPPORT REGISTRY,
EMPLOYER'S GUIDETO CHILD SUPPORT LAWS (1991) (stating that the Washington program produced
a collections to cost ratio of 8 to I during its first year). A ratio of 4 to I is predicted for California.
CALIFORNIA STATE SENATE FLOOR ANALYSIS OF SB 1423, at 2 (May 22, 1992). See generally
Charles D. Creech, Legislating Responsibility: North Carolina'sNew Child Support Enforcement
Acts, 65 N.C. L. REV. 1354 (1987) (discussing the increased federal involvement in child support
enforcement resulting from the growing number of single parent families and increasing reluctance
of noncustodial parents to meet court-ordered child support obligations); Lisa Stamm, Section 1983
and Title IV-D of the Social Security Act. In Pursuitof Improved ChildSupport Enforcement, 60 U.
CN. L. REv. 221 (1991) (stating that, according to the United States Department of Commerce, only
61% of mothers with minor children whose fathers were absent from the home had support orders,
and less than half of the recipients collected full payment, while 26% received partial payment, and
another 26% received nothing).
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mation to the requesting department' for the purpose of locating
delinquent payors of child support.9
LES
Domestic Relations; child support delinquency enforcement
Revenue and Taxation Code §§ 19001, 19002, 19003, 19004
(new and repealed).
AB 3589 (Speier); 1992 STAT. Ch. 1223
Existing law grants all district attorneys1 the power to facilitate
the collection of delinquent child support2 payments due to custodial

8.
See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 11478.51(a) (enacted by Chapter 850) (referring to the
State Department of Social Services or the Parent Locator Service as the departments which may
request the Employment Development Department to compare information collected pursuant to
California Unemployment Insurance Code § 1088.5 to that provided by the State Department of
Social Services).
9.
Chapter 850 specifies that EDD may use the information collected only for: (1) the
administration and enforcement of Chapter 850's provisions; (2) for the identification, prevention and

collection of benefit overpayment, as specified; (3) for the location of noncustodial parents or the
income of noncustodial parents; and (4) for the identification of error on employer reports of wages
filed. CAL. UNEmp. INS. CODE § 1088.5(h)(1)-(4) (enacted by Chapter 850).

1.
See CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 163.5(c) (West 1987) (defining district attorney as the
attorney or legal counsel of the taxing agency); id. § 4802 (West 1987) (defining district attorney as
the civil legal advisor of the county board of supervisors).
2.
See id. § 19001(g) (enacted by Chapter 1223) (defining child support as support of a child,
spouse, or family as provided for in Civil Code § 4390(h)); see also CAL. WEL. & INST. CODE §
1 1350.6(a)(4) (West Supp. 1992) (defining "compliance with a judgment or order for support" as a
situation where the obligor is no more than 30 days late in making payments due as set forth in a
judgment or order for support). See generally 65 Cal. Op. Att'y Gen. 373 (June 6, 1982) (stating that
a district attorney may release the name of a child support obligor to commercial credit bureaus
without violating confidentiality); Yvonne C. Anderson & Richard A. Forster, Kansas Enacts New
ProvisionsFor Child Support Enforcement-MandatoryWage Withholding, 25 WASHBURN LJ. 91,
93-101 (1985) (outlining the history of federal involvement in the passage of child support
legislation); Maureen Gallen, Congress Demands Stricter Child-Support Enforcement: Florida
Requires Major Reforms to Comply, 10 NOVA LJ. 1371, 1380-97 (1986) (describing the four major
objectives of the federal Child Support Enforcement Amendments of 1984); Faye R. Goldberg, Child
Support Enforcement; BalancingIncreased FederalInvolvement with ProceduralDue Process, 19
Su ~oLK U. L. REv. 687, 702-14 (1985) (discussing procedural due process limitations and their
effect on the collection of delinquent child support payments through the withholding of income tax
refunds); Timothy J. Lee, DistrictAttorney Collection of Child Support: The Need for Reform, 55
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parents' from child support obligors.4 Existing law provides that the
Franchise Tax Board (FTB)5 may disclose taxpayer return information6 to the California Parent Locator Service (CPLS) 7 which

CAL ST. B. J. 156, 156-58 (Apr. 1980) (describing the duties of a Family Support Division of a
California District Attorney's Office).
3.
See CAL. CiV. CODE § 4700.10(a)(1) (West Supp. 1992) (defining custodial parent as a
party awarded physical custody of a child); Ventura County v. George, 149 Cal. App. 3d 1012, 1018,
197 Cal. Rptr. 245, 249 (1983) (holding that whether a person is a custodial parent is dependent upon
the degree to which that person exercises possession and physical control over a dependent child).
4.
CAL. WEu'. & INsT. CODE § 11350.1 (West Supp. 1992); see CAL. CIV. CODE § 4390(g)
(West Supp. 1992) (defining obligor as any person owing a duty of support); CAL. WELl. & INST.
CODE § 11350.6(b)-(k) (West Supp. 1992) (specifying the procedures with which the district attorney
must comply when pursuing a delinquent obligor); id. § 11475.1(h) (West 1991) (designating the
district attorney the withholder of an obligor's wages pursuant to the federal Child Enforcement
Program (42 U.S.C. §§ 651-660 (1992)); id. § 11476 (West 1991) (granting the district attorney
power to pursue obligors through cooperation with other state agencies and the federal government);
id. § 11478.6 (West 1991) (granting the district attorney the power to utilize information concerning
an obligor's claim or receipt of workers' compensation benefits); see also 26 U.S.C. § 152(e) (1988)
(stating criteria that must be met before a state court may order a custodial parent to relinquish a tax
exemption to a noncustodial parent); 42 U.S.C. §§ 651-660 (1992) (forming the Child Enforcement
Program portion of the Social Security Act); Singer v. Dickinson, 58. N.E.2d 806, 810 (Ohio Sup.
Ct. 1992) (holding that a trial court may use all of its contempt powers to enforce an order against
a custodial parent to sign a written declaration surrendering his tax exemption to the noncustodial
parent); Ford v. Ford, 592 So. 2d 698, 699 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (holding that a trial court may
order a custodial parent to sign over his tax exemption to the noncustodial parent as long as the
noncustodial parent is current in her child support payments); Monterey County v. Cornejo, 53 Cal.
3d 1271, 1275-76, 812 P.2d 586, 588-89, 283 Cal. Rptr. 405, 407-08 (1991) (stating that a custodial
parent only loses his tax exemption once he signs a written declaration disclaiming the child as an
exemption which the noncustodial parent attaches to her tax return); County of El Dorado v. Spence,
182 Cal. App. 3d 698, 706-07, 227 Cal. Rptr. 365, 370 (1986) (holding that a district attorney has
the power to bring suit for child support only when the support is not being paid by a noncustodial
parent under a prior support order or is not otherwise being supplied). See generally Hyman Sisman,
Family Matters, 10 CAL. LAw. 35 (Dec. 1990) (describing through anecdotes several typical cases
encountered by a Deputy District Attorney working in the Family Support Division of the Los
Angeles County District Attorney's Office).
5.
See CAL. REv. & TAx. CODE § 17003 (West 1983) (defining Franchise Tax Board).
6.
See id. § 19285.5(b) (West Supp. 1992) (defining return information as, among other types
of information, a taxpayer's identity, the nature, source, or amount of the taxpayer's income,
payments, or deductions, and whether the taxpayer's return or any other data was, is being, or will
be examined or subjected to processing by the FIB).
7.
See CAL WEL. & INST. CODE § 11478.5 (West Supp. 1992) (establishing the CPLS
which, among other duties, collects and disseminates information (e.g. name, date of birth, social
security number, and physical description) concerning people who have deserted or abandoned their
child, spouse, or former spouse, to agencies such as the Department of Justice, district attorneys, and
probation departments).
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may assist the CPLS in enforcing an obligor's liability for child
support.'
Chapter 1223 provides that from January 1, 1993 to January 1,
1996, any one of six district attorneys, that have been chosen by the
State Department of Social Services and the FTB to participate in this
program,9 may refer delinquent child support obligations to the FTB
for collection."° Chapter 1223 provides that if collection actions
would cause undue financial hardship or irreparable loss to the
obligors or threaten the health or welfare of the obligors or their
families, the obligors may notify the FTB which will refer them to
the district attorney, unless the FTB has been directed otherwise by
the district attorney."1 Chapter 1223 grants the FTB the power to
pursue out-of-state child support obligors in the same manner that it
12
pursues out-of-state delinquent taxpayers.

ACR

Domestic Relations; community property--retirement plans
Civil Code § 4800.8 (amended).
SB 2018 (Calderon); 1992 STAT. Ch. 431

8.
CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 19285.1(a) (West Supp. 1992); see CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE
§ 10850(f) (West 1991) (stating that access to records relating to public social services is available
to public officers investigating any criminal act); see also 62 Cal. Op. Att'y Gen. 711 (Nov. 21,
1979) (stating that district attorneys pursuing child support obligors shall have full access to any court
records concerning Aid to Families with Dependent Children recipients which are necessary to the
performance of their duties).
9.
See CAL. REv. & TAX. CODE § 19001(a) (enacted by Chapter 1223) (specifying the
number of counties to be selected and the selection procedure).
10.
Id. § 19001(a) (enacted by Chapter 1223); see id. § 2617 (West Supp. 1992) (describing
penalties that may be levied on delinquent taxes); id. § 2635.5 (West Supp. 1992) (granting the FIB
the power to apply tax refunds towards the payment of delinquent tax fines). But see Enfminger v.
Enfinger, 452 F. Supp. 553, 554-55 (M.D. Ga. 1978) (holding that a divorced wife could not garnish
her husband's federal tax refund to satisfy his support obligation to her).
11.
CAL. REv. & TAX. CODE § 19001(d) (enacted by Chapter 1223).
12.
Id. § 19003(a) (enacted by Chapter 1223); see id. § 18837 (West Supp. 1992) (granting
FTB the power to hire out-of-state private collection agencies to carry out its duties).
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Existing law specifies that when dividing community property,'
the court can issue any order necessary to insure that both parties
receive their full community property share in any retirement plan.2
Chapter 431 establishes that the court may not make any order which
results in payments that increase the amount of benefits provided for
in the plan.3 Chapter 431 additionally prohibits the court from
ordering a retirement plan to make pension benefit payments to any

1.
See CAL. CIV. CODE § 687 (West 1982) (defining community property); Katherine Shaw
Spaht, 43 LA. L. REv. 1111, 1111 n.3 (1983) (stating that in addition to Louisiana, there are seven
other community property states: Arizona, California, Idaho, Nevada, New Mexico, Texas, and
Washington). See generally Harry M. Cross, The Community PropertyLaw in Washington, 61 WASH.
L. REv. 13, 18 (1986) (stating that in the community property system, each spouse is regarded as
contributing equally to, and sharing equally in, the economic well-being of the marital enterprise);
Carol S. Bruch, Management Powers and Duties Under California'sCommunity Property Laws:
Recommendationsfor Reform, 34 HASTINrS LJ. 229,231 (1982) (discussing powers of each spouse
to manage and control the community property).
2.
CAL Civ. CODE § 4800.8(a) (amended by Chapter 431). The court may also order a
retirement plan to make payments of community property interest directly to a nonmember. le. §
4800.8(a)(5) (amended by Chapter 431); CA. EDUC. CODE §§ 22650, 22662 (West 1978 & Supp.
1992) (determining the division of community property rights in State Teachers' Retirement System
accounts); CAL. GOVT CODE § 21215 (West Supp.1992) (determining the division of community
property rights in Public Employee Retirement System accounts); see also CAL. Civ. CODE § 4800(a)
(West 1983) (requiring a court to effect a substantially equal division of community estate in a
marriage dissolution proceeding). See generally Griggs v. Griggs, 686 P.2d 68, 71 (Idaho 1984)
(stating that military retirement payments are treated as community property to the extent they were
earned during the marriage); Johnson v. Johnson, 638 P.2d 705, 708 (Ariz. 1981) (recognizing that
pension benefits based on contributions provided during marriage are community property subject
to division in dissolution proceedings); In re Marriage of Hillerman, 109 Cal. App. 3d 334, 338, 167
Cal. Rptr. 240, 242 (1980) (stating that retirement benefits attributable to employment are considered
community property upon the dissolution of marriage regardless of their source); Kreimeyer v.
Kreimeyer, 606 P.2d 834, 835 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1980) (holding that a wife was entitled to a share of
her husband's pension which had accrued when her husband was stationed in noncommunity property
states where those states had statutes authorizing division of property of parties); T.L. James & Co.
Inc. v. Montgomery, 332 So. 2d 834, 846 (La. 1975) (holding that a husband's profit-sharing plan
and benefit pension plan proceeds were community property); Cheney v. City & County of San
Francisco, 7 Cal. 2d 565, 569, 61 P.2d 754, 756 (1936) (stating that pension rights created by act of
the California Legislature have been determined to be community property).
3.
CAL CIV. CODE § 4800.8(b)(1) (amended by chapter 431); see id. § 4800.8(a)(2)
(amended by chapter 431) (stating that a court may not also order a retirement plan to pay increased
benefits established on the basis of actuarial value); In re Marriage of Gillmore, 29 Cal. 3d 418,428,
629 P.2d 1, 7, 174 Cal. Rptr. 493, 499 (1981) (holding that a spouse who asks for a distribution of
an employee spouse's retirement benefits before the employee spouse actually retires, makes an
irrevocable election to give up increased payments in the future which might accrue due to increased
age, longer service and a higher salary).
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party before the plan member retires unless the plan so provides.4
Chapter 431 provides that this section will not apply retroactively to
retirement payments made before January 1, 1987, or to State
Teachers' Retirement System or Public Employee Retirement System
account payments made before June 1, 1988. 5
CLR
Domestic Relations; domestic violence crimes
Penal Code §§ 243, 262, 273.5, 273.6 (amended).
AB 2439 (Archie-Hudson); 1992 STAT. Ch. 184
AB 2762 (Lee); 1992 STAT. Ch. 1209

4.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 4800.8(b)(2) (amended by Chapter 431). Payment of benefits can be
made to a party before the member dies if provided for in accounts with the Public Employee
Retirement System or the State Teachers' Retirement System. d. § 4800.8(a)(3)-(4) (amended by
Chapter 431). Chapter 431 attempts to codify case law which has held that employee spouses, rather
than retirement plans, are responsible for making retirement payments to nonemployee spouses when
the employee chooses not to retire when they are eligible. SENATE COMM=IE ON JUDICIARY,
CoMrtrrEE ANALYSIS o SB 2018, at 4 (May 5, 1992); see In re Marriage of Crook, 2 Cal. App.
4th 1606, 1609, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d 905, 907 (1992) (holding that a nonemployee spouse should not be
deprived of her rights in a community property pension because the employee spouse elects to
continue to work); In re Marriage of Jensen, 235 Cal. App. 3d 1137, 1141-42, 286 Cal. Rptr. 911,
913 (1991) (holding that a nonemployee spouse can begin receiving his or her share of retirement
benefits as soon as the employee spouse becomes eligible to retire, but that the onus of making the
payment cannot be construed as being placed on the retirement plan); In re Marriage of Nice, 230
Cal. App. 3d 444, 446, 281 Cal. Rptr. 415, 416 (1991) (specifying that it is the employee spouse and
not the retirement plan that retains responsibility for compensating the nonemployee spouse's decision
to continue employment); In re Marriage of Gillmore, 29 Cal. 3d 418, 423, 426, 629 P.2d 1, 4, 6,
174 Cal. Rptr. 493, 496, 498 (1981) (holding that one spouse cannot defeat the community interest
of the other by invoking a condition only within the control of that spouse, and requiring the
employee spouse to divide his retirement benefits with the nonemployee spouse or to pay her an
amount equivalent to her interest if he did not want to retire).
5.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 4800.8(5)(c) (amended by Chapter 431). But see In re Marriage of
Taylor, 189 Cal. App. 3d 435, 442, 234 Cal. Rptr. 486, 491 (1987) (holding that a statute can apply
retroactively when enacted to cure an injustice and to promote the state interest in equitable division
of community property); In re Marriage of Powers, 218 Cal. App. 3d 626, 644, 267 Cal. Rptr. 350,
360 (1990) (supporting the retroactive application of § 4800.8).
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Under existing law, when a person is convicted of a crime and
given probation,1 the court must order, as a condition of probation,
that the person pay restitution2 to the victim or to a restitution fund
if there is no victim, or that the person perform community service 3
Chapter 184 and Chapter 1209 authorize a court to order a defendant
convicted of specified domestic violence crimes4 to pay restitution,
as a condition of probation and in lieu of a fine, to a domestic
violence shelter or to the victim to cover counseling costs or any
other reasonable costs which resulted from the defendant's criminal
behavior.5

1.
See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203(a)-) (West Supp. 1992) (specifying condition- for
probation).
2.
See kL § 1203.04(d) (West Supp. 1992) (defining restitution as partial or full payment of
the value of damaged or stolen property, medical expenses, and wages and lost profits, to the extent
that these losses occurred due to the defendant's commission of the crime).
3.
Id. § 1203.04(a), (b) (West Supp. 1992); cf.ARZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-284(B)(7) (1991)
(allowing the state treasurer to transmit 80% of monies gained through specified fees to domestic
violence shelters); MINN. STAT. § 609.101()(3) (1992) (allowing for 70% of fees to be given to a
local victim assistance program which includes battered women's shelters).
4.
See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 243(e)(l)-(2), 262(c)(1)-(2), 273.5(h)(l)-(2) (amended by
Chapter 184) (proscribing penalties for committing domestic violence crimes, including abuse or
battery against a spouse or cohabitant or spousal rape); id. § 273.6(a) (amended by Chapter 1209)
(including in the definition of domestic violence crimes any willful and knowing violations of
specified court orders used to prevent domestic violence); see also id. § 262(a) (amended by Chapter
184) (defining rape of a spouse); id. § 243(e) (amended by Chapter 184) (specifying punishment for
battery of a spouse, fiance, and person of a dating relationship); id. § 243(a) (amended by Chapter
184) (specifying punishment for battery); Id § 273.6(c)(l)-(3) (amended by Chapter 1209) (specifying
which court orders are included); Joyce Faidley, Judge MirrorsSpousal-Abuse Myths: Misplaced
Regrets over Sentencing a Symptom of the Violence Malaise, L.A. TImEs, July 9, 1989, § 2, at 2
(describing how battered women's shelters help victims obtain restraining orders by providing
counseling and support).
5.
CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 243(e)(1)-(2), 262(c)(l)-(2), 273.5(h)(l)-(2) (amended by Chapter
184); iaU § 273.6(0(2) (amended by Chapter 1209); see Natalie Loder Clark, Crime Begins at Home:
Let's Stop Punishing Victims and Perpetuating Violence, 28 WM. & MARY L. REV. 263, 264-65
(1987) (discussing the importance and continuing need for shelters for battered women); Veronica
T. Jennings, Man Convicted in Sex Attack on Wife, WASH. POST, Oct. 18, 1990, at E7 (finding that
30% of women seeking help in shelters are victims of sexual abuse); Janice Mall, About Women:
Murders: History of Family Violence, L.A. TIMEs, June 8, 1986, at 6 (discussing the problems
women encounter due to the lack of shelters, even though California does allocate a large amount
of funds to such programs); Ralph Novak, Will We BeatSwords into Plowshares,TmIE, Jan. 8, 1990,
at 30 (discussing the limited available services of shelters today and emphasizing the need for
expanded services); Columbia Man Convicted UnderSpousalRape Law, WASH. POST., Sept. 7, 1990,
at C7 (describing the importance of counselors at women's shelters helping victims of sexual abuse).
See generally Jo-Ann Armao, MarylandSenate PassesBill Outlawing Spousal Rape, WVASH. POST.,
Mar. 22, 1989 (discussing the growing problem of domestic violence in the nation).
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Existing law provides that when a married person causes injury
to his or her spouse through a negligent or wrongful act, the separate
property of the tortfeasor spouse must be exhausted before the com-6
munity property can be used to discharge the tortfeasor's liability.
Chapter 184 and Chapter 1209 provide that when a married person
causes injury to a spouse through criminal acts of spousal abuse,
spousal rape and violation of court orders to prevent domestic violence, the separate property of the tortfeasor spouse must be exhausted before the community property can be used to discharge the
liability for restitution.'
Existing law provides that any willful' and knowing9 violation
of specified temporary restraining orders is a misdemeanor. 10

6.
CAL CIV. CODE § 5113(a) (1983); see CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.04(a)-(b) (West Supp.
1992) (describing provisions for paying restitution). See generally In re Marriage of McNeill, 160
Cal. App. 3d 548, 206 Cal. Rptr. 641 (1984) (discussing deductions from community property
resulting from a civil suit by a husband against his wife).
7.
CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 273.5(h)(2), 243(e)(2), 262(c)(2) (amended by Chapter 184); id §
273.6(0(2) (amended by Chapter 1209); see id. § 273.5(a) (amended by Chapter 184) (specifying
abuse of a spouse or cohabitant as a felony punishable by imprisonment of two, three, or four years);
id § 262(a) (amended by Chapter 184) (defining rape of a spouse); id. § 262(c) (amended by Chapter
184) (specifying conditions of probation, in lieu of a fine, for a person convicted of spousal rape).
8.
See id § 7(1) (West 1988) (defining willfully).
9.
See id § 7(5) (West 1988) (defining knowingly).
10.
Id § 273.6(a) (amended by Chapter 1209); see id § 17(b) (West Supp. 1992) (defining
misdemeanor); id § 273.6(c)(1)-(3) (amended by Chapter 1209) (setting forth the specified temporary
restraining orders, including, but not limited to, an order enjoining any party from molesting,
attacking, striking, threatening, sexually assaulting, battering, harassing, disturbing the peace of the
other party, or other named family and household members, excluding one party from the family
dwelling, or enjoining a party from specified behavior); UL § 273.6(a) (amended by Chapter 1209)
(providing for a fine of not more than $1000, imprisonment in the county jail for not more than one
year, or both).
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Chapter 1209 makes it a misdemeanor to violate any order enjoining
a party from contacting repeatedly by mail with the intent to
harass."
EB[KAR
Domestic Relations; marital dissolution and property rights
Civil Code §§ 4372, 4373 (new); §§ 4370.5, 4800.10,
4800.11, 5127 (amended).
AB 3399 (Speier); 1992 STAT. Ch. 356
Existing law authorizes a court to award attorney's fees and costs
to either party in proceedings under the Family Law Act' if the

11.
Ud2§ 273.6(a) (amended by Chapter 1209); see CAL CIV. PROC. CODE § 527.6(b) (West
Supp. 1992) (defining harassment); A RemedialApproach to Harassment,70 VA. L. REy. 507, 513

(1984) (calling for effective legal sanctions to combat the psychological distress caused by harassment
and the potential for actual harm); Schnitz v. Indiana, 475 N.E.2d 59, 60-61 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985)
(finding that letters, sent to a daughter from her father, who was serving his second sentence in prison
for molesting her, vividly describing sexual activity which he hoped to engage in with her, were not
made with the intent to harass or upset her, but rather, made with the wish to enhance his chances
of engaging in further relations with her); Yates v. Kentucky, 753 S.W.2d 874, 875-76 (Ky. App. Ct.
1988) (dismissing a claim that a Kentucky statute, which makes it a crime to communicate with a
person by mail with the intent to harass, violates the First Amendment right of free speech since only
the conduct of a person is being controlled, conduct that intrudes upon an individual's right to
privacy and right to be left alone, not the thoughts or ideas conveyed); id. at 876 (holding that the
harassment statute was not void for vagueness); cf ALA. CODE § 13A-1 1-8(b)(1)(a) (1992); ARK.
CODE ANN. § 5-71-209(a)(1) (Michie 1992); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-133(a)(2) (1990); N.Y. PEneAL
LAw § 240.30(1) (Consol. 1992) (stating that a person commits the crime of harassing
communications if he or she communicates with a person by mail with the intent to harass); MINN.
STAT. § 609.795(3) (1991) (providing that a person is guilty of a misdemeanor if he or she repeatedly
uses the mails or delivers letters, telegrams, or packages with the intent to harass). But see City of
Everett v. Moore, 683 P.2d 617, 618-619 (Wash. App. Ct. 1984) (holding a Washington statute,
creating a crime for communicating by mail with the intent to harass, was unconstitutionally vague
because it could be applied to constitutionally protected speech and did not have the "precision of
regulation" required by the First Amendment).

1.
Act).

See CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 4000-5317 (West 1983 & Supp. 1992) (codifying the Family Law
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award is just and reasonable. 2 Under Chapter 356, the court may
implement a case management plan3 for allocating fees and costs if
the court finds that the case involves complex or substantial issues.4

The court may also appoint a referee to oversee the plan.5
Existing law prohibits, for any reason, the transfer of community
real property by one party without the consent of the other.6 Chapter
356 allows either party to encumber their interest in community real
property for the purpose of maintaining legal counsel.7 This encum-

2.
Id. § 4370.5(a) (West Supp. 1992). The amount of the award must be just and reasonable
under the relative circumstances of the respective parties. Id; see k § 4370.5(b) (West Supp. 1992)
(stating that financial resources are only one factor considered by the court in determining the award);
In re Marriage of Joseph, 217 Cal. App. 3d 1277, 1285, 266 Cal. Rptr. 548, 553 (1990) (holding that
a waiver contained in the Marital Settlement Agreement did not bar an award to the wife of
attorney's fees and costs); In re Marriage of Melone, 193 Cal. App. 3d 757, 765, 238 Cal. Rptr. 510,
514 (1987) (holding that the wife was entitled to attorney fees against her husband, based on the
wife's prima facie showing of need and indications that, despite husband's claim of poverty, he was
better equipped financially to pay her attorney fees and costs); In re Marriage of Wolfe, 173 Cal.
App. 3d 889, 890, 219 Cal. Rptr. 337, 338 (1985) (holding that a trial court which determined
bifurcated issues in a marital dissolution proceeding may award attorney fees and costs despite the
previous final dissolution judgment which determined most issues and provided that each party was
to bear his or her own attorney fees and costs to date).
3.
See CAL. Civ. CODE § 4370.5(d) (amended by Chapter 356) (stating that the case
management plan shall focus on specific and designated issues and may provide for the allocation
of assets, security against assets, and for payments from income for either party).
4.
Id The complex or substantial issues of fact or law should be related to property rights,
visitation, custody, or support. Id.; see id (stating that either party may request the court to make
such a finding at any time prior to the hearing of the cause on the merits). A number of states have
similar laws allowing the court to award attorney's fees after considering all relevant factors, yet do
not provide for the implementation of case management plans. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 30-2-54 (1989)
(stating the court may allow award of attorney's fees only where a contempt citation is issued);
ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.140(a)(1) (1991); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-12-309 (Michie 1991); GA. CODE
ANN. § 19-6-2 (1991); IDAHO CODE § 32-704(2) (1983); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.220 (Baldwin
1990); MASS. GEN. LAWs ANN. ch. 208, § 38 (West 1987); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 452.355 (Vernon
1986); NEV. REv.STAT. § 125.040(1)(c) (1991); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16-4 (1991); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 14-06-02 (1991); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-5-16(a) (1988); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-3 (1989);
W. VA. CODE § 48-2-13(a)(4) (1992); Wyo. STAT. § 20-2-111 (1992).
5.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 4370.5 (amended by Chapter 356); see CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 639
(West Supp. 1992) (specifying when a court may appoint a referee).
6.
CAL. Civ. CODE § 5127 (amended by Chapter 356); see Droeger v. Friedman, Sloan &
Ross, 54 Cal. 3d 26, 30, 812 P.2d 931, 932, 283 Cal. Rptr. 584, 585 (1991) (holding that a lien on
community real property by one party to secure payment in order to retain an attorney violated Civil
Code § 5127).
7.
CAL. CIrV. CODE § 4372(a) (enacted by chapter 356); see AssEMBLY COMMrrrEE ON
JUDIcIARY, COMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 3399 (May 6, 1992) (stating the author's purpose for the
bill is to allow the economically weaker party to be able to retain legal counsel when real property
may be the only asset a party has); see also Droeger,54 Cal. 3d at 41, 812 P.2d at 940, 283 Cal.
Rptr. at 593 (stating that it is not the court's, but the Legislature's job to amend § 5127 to create an
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brance is called a family law attorney's real property lien (hereinafter
referred to as lien).8 Chapter 356 requires that notice must be served
at least fifteen days before the encumbrance is recorded.' The party
not recording the lien may file an ex parte objection to the lien. 1
The court may deny the lien on a finding that it is unjust or would
result in an unequal division of community property, or may limit the
amount of the lien for good cause." Chapter 356 also specifies that,
on its own motion, the court may determine that the case involves
complex or substantial issues, and may then direct the implementation of a case management plan. 12 Chapter 356 provides that
an attorney obtaining a lien under Chapter 356 must comply with the
13
State Bar rule regarding conflicts of interest.
Existing law provides that in a marriage dissolution proceeding,
a court is required to divide the parties' community estate equally and

exception which allows a spouse to unilaterally transfer community real property in order to secure
attorney fees in a dissolution proceeding). The seven other community property states also prohibit
the transfer of community property without the consent of the other spouse, but do not allow either
spouse to encumber their interest in community real property for the purpose of maintaining legal
counsel. See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-214(C) (1991); IDAHO CODE § 32-912 (1983); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 2347 (West 1985); NEv. REV. STAT. § 123.230(3) (1991); N.M. STAT. ANN §
40-3-13 (Michie 1978); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 5.22(c), 5.81 (West 1975); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 26.16.030 (West 1986).
8.
CAI. CIV. CODE § 4372(a) (amended by Chapter 356). The family law attorney's real
property lien can only attach to the encumbering party's interest in the community real property. Id.
9.
Id. § 4372(b) (enacted by Chapter 356) (stating that notice can be served either personally
or on the other party's attorney); see id. § 4372(b)(1)-(5) (enacted by Chapter 356) (specifying that
notice should contain: A full description of the real property, fair market value of the property and
documentation, list of any encumbrances existing as of the date of the declaration, list of community
assets and debts with estimated values, and the amount of the family law attorney's real property
lien).
10.
I& § 4372(c) (enacted by Chapter 356); see id. § 4372(c)(1)-(3) (enacted by Chapter 356)
(stating that the objection must include a request to stay the recordation until further notice of the
court, a copy of the notice received, and a signed declaration).
11.
Id. § 4373(a) (enacted by Chapter 356).
12.
Id § 4373(b) (enacted by chapter 356). The court may make the determination upon
receiving an objection to the establishment of a family law attorney's real property lien. let; see supra
note 4 and accompanying text (defining complex or substantial issues for this section).
13.
CAL. Civ. CODE § 4372(e) (enacted by Chapter 356); see MODEL RULES OF PRO'S-sONAL
CONDUCT OF THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA Rule 3-300 (1992) (stating that an attorney must avoid
entering into a transaction or acquiring interest adverse to a client).
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value the assets as of the time of trial." In such an action, the court
must file its decision and conclusions of law.15 Upon request of a

party, the court must issue a statement of decision explaining the
legal and factual basis for the result.' Existing law also provides
that the parties must file an income and expense declaration and a

property declaration when relevant to the relief requested.' 7 Chapter
356 provides that each party in a marriage dissolution proceeding

must serve the other party with a preliminary declaration of disclosure which sets forth the declarant's assets 8 and liabilities. 9

14.
CAL. CIv. CODE § 4800(a) (West Supp. 1992); see In re Marriage of Priddis, 132 Cal.
App. 3d 349, 358, 183 Cal. Rptr. 37, 41 (1982) (holding that despite the fact the parties were
separated for over eleven years, community assets were required to be valued as of the date of the
trial and the wife was entitled to share in the increase in value of the home which the husband
occupied exclusively); In re Marriage of Gillmore, 29 Cal. 3d 418,422, 629 P.2d 1, 3, 174 Cal. Rptr.
493, 495 (1981) (holding that retirement benefits earned by the spouse during marriage are
community property, subject to equal division upon dissolution of that marriage); In re Marriage of
Paddock, 18 Cal. App. 3d 355, 357-58, 95 Cal. Rptr. 652, 653 (1971) (holding that segregating the
homestead from the rest of the community property and awarding it to one party, and then dividing
remaining community property equally rather than dividing all community property, including the
homestead, equally, was in error). Other states' laws do not stipulate an equal division of property,
but instead provide for the court to make an equitable distribution of property. See, e.g., ALASKA
STAT. § 25.24.160(a)(4) (1991); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1513(a) (1981); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-111.5-1 l(a) (West 1979); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.190(1) (Baldwin 1991); MAss. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 208, § 34 (West 1987); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-202(1) (1991); NEB. R V. STAT. § 42365 (1988); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 458:16-a(II) (Supp. 1991) (stating there is a rebuttable
presumption that an equal division of property is an equitable division); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(a)
(1991); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-05-24 (1991); R.I. GEN. LAwS § 15-5-16.1(a) (1988); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 20-7-472 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1991); S.D. CODnED LAws ANN. § 25-4-44 (1992); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 36-4-121(a)(1) (1991); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-5(1) (1989); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15,
§ 751(a) (1989); WYO. STAT. § 20-2-114 (1992).
15.
CAL CIv. CODE § 4512 (West Supp. 1992).
16.
CAL Civ. PRoc. CODE § 632 (West Supp. 1992); see In re Marriage of Ramer, 187 Cal.
App. 3d 263, 271, 231 Cal. Rptr. 647, 650 (1986) (concluding that a statement of decision was
inadequate because it did not reveal the trial court's finding regarding the parties' income and
expenses).
17.
CAL. R. Cr. 1225(b). An income and expense declaration and property declaration are not
required when the matter is to be disposed of by default or as an uncontested proceeding. Id 1243.
Existing law also provides that any unprivileged material which is relevant to the subject matter
involved in the pending action may also be discovered. CAL. Crv. PROC. CODE § 2017(a) (West
Supp. 1992). Sanctions for failing to comply with discovery requests include monetary sanctions,
contempt, and prohibiting the noncomplying party from introducing designated matters into evidence.
Id § 2023(b)(l)-(5) (West Supp. 1992).
18.
See CAL. Civ. CODE § 4800.10(h)(1) (enacted by Chapter 356) (defining asset as any real
or personal property of any nature, whether tangible or intangible).
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Chapter 356 also provides that each party must file with the court,
and serve upon the other party, a current income and expense declaration and a final declaration of disclosure which contains all material
facts regarding assets and liabilities, community assets and obligations, current earnings and accumulations,2 0 and current
21
expenses.
CLR/TKT
Domestic Relations; telephone harassment
Civil Code §§ 4612, 7009 (new); §§ 4359, 7020 (amended);
Code of Civil Procedure § 547.7 (new); § 545.5 (amended);
Penal Code §§ 653m, 12028.5, 13700 (amended).
SB 1541 (McCorquodale); 1992 STAT. Ch. 1136
Under existing law it is a misdemeanor to harass a person by
making repeated telephone calls to that person's residence with the
intent to annoy except if the calls are made in good faith.' Chapter
1136 makes it a misdemeanor to call a person's place of work with

19.
Id. § 4800.10(c)(1)(A)-(B) (enacted by Chapter 356); see id. § 4800.10(h)(2) (enacted by
Chapter 356) (defiming liability as any debt or obligation, whether currently existing or contingent).
Such a disclosure need not be exchanged if good cause exists or if agreed to by the parties. Id. §
4800.10(c)(1)(A) (enacted by Chapter 356). An income and expense declaration must be provided
with the preliminary declaration of disclosure. Id § 4800.10(c)(1)(B) (enacted by Chapter 356).
20.
See id. § 4800.10(h)(3) (enacted by Chapter 356) (defining earnings and accumulations).
21.
Id § 4800.10(c)(2)(A)-(D) (enacted by Chapter 356); see id. § 4800.10(h)(4) (enacted by
Chapter 356) (defiming expenses). If one party fails to serve a preliminary or fimal declaration of
disclosure, the court may order the noncomplying party to pay the complying party all reasonable
attorney's fees. Id. § 4800.10(f) (enacted by Chapter 356).

1.
CAL. PENAL CODE. § 653m(b) (ameded by Chapter 1136); cf. N.Y. PENAL LAW §
240.30(2)(Consol. 1989) (having no provision which restricts harassment by telephone to residence
only); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 1-203 (1991) (providing injunctive relief to protect a party from
harassment, but not mentioning telephone harassment). See generally Harassment Statute is
Constitutiona4 But Information is Found Defective, N.Y. LU., Aug. 20, 1990, at 21 (discussing the
constitutionality of the New York telephone harassment statute); Sue Anne Pressley, Two Year
Telephone Trauma; Md Harassment Victim's Life is on Hold, WASH. PosT, Nov. 3, 1988, at Al
(giving an example of the problems associated with telephone harassment, and describing the
magnitude of the problem).
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the intent to annoy the person if the calls violate a restraining order,
court order or injunction. 2 Chapter 1136 also makes it a misdemeanor if the person makes more than ten calls within a twenty-four
hour period with the intent to annoy a person at his place of work,
and the person called is an adult or emancipated minor who is a

spouse, former spouse, cohabitant, former cohabitant, fiance, fiancee
or any person with whom the person has had a child, or dating
relationship.3
EB

2.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 653m(c)(1) (amended by Chapter 1136).
3.
Id § 653m(c)(2) (amended by Chapter 1136); see id § 653m(c) (amended by Chapter
1136) (specifying punishment for workplace telephone harassment as a misdemeanor punishable by
a fine of $1,000 or less, or imprisonment of one year or less, or both fine and imprisonment). See
generally In re Carolyn Elias, 205 Cal. App. 3d 166, 170-74, 252 Cal. Rptr. 348, 349-52 (1989)
(discussing whether the Penal Code § 653m is overbroad and thus unconstitutional, and the problems
created when applying the statute to business complaints); Andrea J. Robinson, Note, A Remedial
Approach to Harassment,70 VA. L. Rv. 507 (1984) (discussing the harm that can result from such
harassment, its relation to causes of action for privacy, and the constitutionality and differences of
various state and federal statutes directed solely at telephonic harassment including a comparative
chart in the appendix).
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